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BringingBack the Shotgun Wedding
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG,

JR.

ACK
IN THE
1950s,
at the peak
baby inboom,
no one
thought
that late
teenage
parenthood
was ofa the
problem
this eountry.
To be sure, lots of adoleseents had babies--even
more than do today-but almost all were married before or shortly after the pregnancy oeeurred. As some family sociologists observed at the time, pregnancy
was often part of the eourtship proeess, propelling many young eouples into marriage at an aeeelerated paee. Women risked their reputations when they eonsented to have sex. If they were unlueky enough to
get pregnant,
their boyfriends were expeeted to do the honorable
thing--whieh
they usually did, whether willingly or reluetantly.
As many as half of all teenage brides in the late 1950s were pregnant when they took their wedding vows. Sinee nearly half of all
women were married by twenty, almost one woman in four started
her family as a pregnant teenager. Partly because of the prevalence
of shotgun weddings, few babies were born out of wedloek in the late
1950s--at least by today's standards. Less than one-fifth of the births
to teens oeeurred out of wedloek, compared with about three-fifths
today. Adoleseent parenthood beeame a publie issue only when pregnant teenagers stopped marrying as a matter of eourse.
Why, then, as Maris Vinovskis and P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale
wondered
in "Should We Diseourage
Teenage Marriage?"
(The
Public Interest, Spring 1987), did teenage marriages
deeline so
rapidly? Should we reinstate the time-honored
practice of shotgun
weddings, as Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
seem to suggest? Their
argument admittedly has appeal. It is always attractive to discover
a private solution to a publie problem The evidence they muster
seems to indicate that if we eould induee teens to marry, we might
signifieantly reduce welfare expenditures while inereasing the wellbeing of ehildren. A eloser look at the faets, however, suggests that
shotgun weddings are not likely to provide mueh help to the beleaguered polieymakers
looking for a solution to the problem of teenage pregnaney or, for that matter, to the teenagers themselves.
HERE ARE two parts to the Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
argument. First, they tell us that soeial-seienee opinion helped to
create a elimate that discouraged
teenage marriage,
and possibly
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even contributed
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to the rise in out-of-wedlock

births.

If this is true,

then changing the perception that early marriage is a high-risk strategy for pregnant teens might help promote a less negative attitude
about teen marriage. With that aim in mind, they present evidence
purporting
to demonstrate
that teen marriages can benefit young
mothers and their offspring, by mitigating the negative consequences
of early childbearing.
Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
argue that the sharp decline in
teenage marriages following premarital
pregnancy
(and therefore
the accompanying
precipitous rise in out-of-wedlock
births in the
late 1960s and 1970s) might have been retarded had social-science
experts held a less negative opinion of teen marriage.
Of course
Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
recognize that the major sources of
the decline in early marriage are the diminishing stigma of out-ofwedlock childbearing,
the support services for single mothers, the
growing recognition of the need for prolonged schooling, and the
inability of young men (especially among minorities) to support a
separate household.
Yet they contend that, independent
of these
sources, social scientists contributed to "an atmosphere which minimized the responsibility of the father" by questioning the benefits of
early marriage. In a curiously phrased rebuke, Vinovskis and ChaseLansdale assert that social scientists may have generated a bias
against marriage because "they did not challenge the view that
pregnant teenagers should be discouraged from marrying."
The main evidence supporting this statement is drawn from the
testimony of several social scientists at two Congressional hearings,
one in 1975 and the other in 1978. According to Vinovskis and ChaseLansdale, by the late 1970s a consensus had emerged downplaying
the potential value of marriage. For example, Wendy Baldwin, one
of the nation's leading experts on teenage parenthood,
contended
that "marriage is not a solution, especially for the very young teenager." We'll examine the experts' conclusions later; but first, we
must remember exactly what the experts were saying.
Skepticism about the potential benefits of marriage for pregnant
teens did not surface until the 1970s, well after the most dramatic
changes began to occur. In 1976, in one of the first books on the consequences of teenage parenthood,
I examined the responses of teens
to pregnancy and parenthood.
In a chapter on marriage, which extensively reviewed the existing literature on teenage marriage, I discovered that few experts had ever thought about the negative sideeffects of early marriage. When I (and other researchers) began to
raise questions about the desirability of teenage marriage, we were
confining our skepticism to the value of marriage for younger teens,
particularly
those who had not yet completed high school. Social
scientists did not discourage marriage for adolescents in their late teens.
To what extent did the experts' views influence the behavior of
teens? The demographic
data simply don't support Vinovskis and
Chase-Lansdale's
claim that by cautioning against early marriage,
the experts encouraged
out-of-wedlock
births. By the time the ex-
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perts were reinterpreting
the value of early marriage, young people
had already concluded that marriage was not a smart move. White
youth began to eschew early marriage in the mid-1960s, a deeade
before the first studies of teenage pregnancy appeared. Black youth
began to shy away from marriage even earlier. In fact, as I observed
above, the problem of teenage pregnancy
first came into public
view because growing numbers of teens were eleeting not to marry
when they became pregnant.
Did the pace of change pick up once expert opinion coaleseed? A
recent report by the National Center for Vital Statistics suggests not.
It shows that a somewhat higher proportion of first births to teenagers (26.1 percent vs. 19.1 percent) was legitimated by marriage in
1980 than in 1972. O'Connell and Rogers, drawing on data from
census surveys, discover not a decline but rather a leveling-off in tile
proportion of pregnant teens who elect to marry. In either ease, the
data do not show that the eonsensus of professional opinion was
affecting teens in any way that would support the trend Vinovskis
and Chase-Lansdale
predict.
One further pieee of demographie
evidence leads me to doubt
Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale's
rendering of the facts. Beginning in
the late 1960s, premaritally pregnant women in their earl tj twenties
were also rejecting marriage as a "solution.'" The decline in the pereentage of mature women who legitimated their births was almost
identical to the pattern observed among teenagers. Whatever was
making young women skittish about marriage was also leading more
mature women to the same conclusion. Ill neither ease is there any
evidence that expert opinion was a factor in their deeisions.

TILL,
we should
dismissthemselves
out of handarethewrong.
possibility
that both
the experts
and not
the teens
Vinovskis
and
Chase-Lansdale
argue that teenage marriages are surprisingly resillient and that marriage protects the economic interests of both women
and children. In making their ease, they rely heavily on evidenee
derived from work that my colleagues, J. Brooks-Gunn and S. Philip
Morgan, recently completed with me--a follow-up study of some
300 teenage mothers from Baltimore who were first interviewed
when they were pregnant
in the mid-1960s. There are problems
with their selective use of the data from our study, and with their
interpretation
of its results and of other related research,
Before reviewing the evidence on the long-term effeets of marriage based on the recently completed seventeen--year follow-up,
let's go back to the initial study, which was done when the young
mothers first became pregnant. That was the time when the pregnant teens were deciding whether or not to marry Why did some
young woinen wed the father of the child while others chose to postpone marriage? At the risk of simplifying a eomplex story, I would
argue that a great deal hinged on the circumstanees of the father at
the time the pregnancy
occurred. Women generally married the
father of the child when thev were emotionally involved with him
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(not all were) and when he was both willing and able to support
them and their children. Other considerations
such as family pressure, age, and educational
aspirations entered into their calculations, but the principal determinant of whether or not they married
was the economic and emotional desirability of the father as a marriage partner. Inevitably, the older and more emotionally mature
women elected to marry. Marriage was a far less attractive proposition for younger girls whose relations with their boyfriends were less
secure (as were their boyfriends' financial prospeets). The accounts
of two women who elected not to marry the father are typical of
what I learned from the interviews:
He and I definitely broke up. He doesn't have enough education. Marriage with him wouldn't work out.
Because really I found out if he keeps going the way he is now, there will
be no future in marriage for us. He is very unsettled in jobs.
So the women in the Baltimore study were calculating
their
chances of marital stability and of long-term support. How accurate
were their assessments? As Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
report,
about one in three of these early marriages survives--a figure that is
close to the national average for black females who marry as teenagers. For whites, the odds are somewhat better. About half the
teenage marriages of white women survive for as long as fifteen
years. (The risks of dissolution are worse for younger teens and
better for older teens.)
These figures provide an imperfect guide to the situation facing
women who must make the decision today. Current divorce rates
are significantly greater than they were for women who married in
the 1960s. Thus, it is likely that the risks of marital disruption are
much higher today than they were two decades ago. Nevertheless,
let's assume the best, as Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
do. Should
we encourage teenagers to marry on the basis of the statistics?
If one marriage in three survives (as seems to be true for the women
in the Baltimore study), isn't this better than what might have happened had the women elected to postpone marriage? After all, married women are better off than female heads of families. As Vinovskis
and Chase-Lansdale
remind us, "Although a stable marriage for
pregnant adolescents is difficult to attain, it offers tangible economic
benefits for those who are able to achieve it." Moreover, children
clearly derive benefits from the economic and psychological support
of having two parents in the home. (Here, too, Vinovskis and ChaseLansdale cite data from the Baltimore study, as well as other recent research, showing that married women and their children are better off.)
None of these data directly speaks to the issue of whether it is
wise for teens to marry. To answer this question it is necessary to
compare the life situations of pregnant teens who married with those
who waited to wed. Here the results of the seventeen-year follow-up
are instructive.
We report that women who married within a year
after the birth of their child were neither more nor less likely to be
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on welfare seventeen years later. Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
disregarded this finding, reporting instead that women who were still
married at the five-year follow-up did somewhat better in the long
run. As we state in our report, this group of women does not include
those who had an early divorce--about
40 percent of the women
who marry before or shortly after their child is born. In other
words, if you can marry and remain married you do better on the
average. But the corollary finding is that if you marry and separate,
you do worse on the average.
HE QUESTION remains: Is it better to marry right away or marry
later? This question can only be answered by comparing women
who married as teenagers with those who waited to wed. I have
gone back to the Baltimore data to make this comparison, restricting the analysis to black women, since too few whites remain in tile
sample to make adequate comparisons.
The contrast between the
early and later marriers is complicated
by the fact that almost all
the women who married the fathers of their children married as teenagers, while those who married later, with few exceptions, married
men who were not their children's fathers. As i have already mentioned, women who married the fathers tended to marry only when
the father was older, better employed, and more emotionally committed to their children. Consequently,
we might expect their marriages to be more stable than those of women who waited.
In fact, they are not. Teen marriages are distinctly less stable
than marriages that occur after age twenty. (Twenty-three
percent
vs. 53 percent were intact at the seventeen-year
follow-up.) Early
marriages, of course, have had more time to break up; but this fact
alone does not account for the substantial difference. Because the)'
are also more likely to be currently
married, later marriers are
somewhat less likely to be on welfare (18 percent vs. 26 percent)
and more likely to have family incomes of $25,000 or more (32 percent vs. 26 percent). And, consistent with the view of the experts,
later marriers are more likely to have completed high school (77 percent vs. 68 percent) and to have obtained some higher education
(38 percent vs. 26 percent). Finally, later marriers have fewer children (2.0 vs. 2.3). Even if we restrict our comparisons to the women
who married the fathers of their children, it remains the case that
those women who married within a year of the child's birth consistently did slightly worse on the various outcome measures than those
who postponed marriage.
Does early marriage pay off? Apparently not--at least if we contrast women who married before or shortly after the birth of their
child with those who waited until they were at least twenty. This is
not to say that none of the early marriages panned out. As my collaborators and I concluded from examining the results of the seventeenyear follow-up, "Marriage is a high-risk strategy, but stable unions
bring huge dividends in terms of higher economic status."
Generally speaking, however, early marriage is a poorer bet
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than waiting to wed. The dissolution rate of early marriages is so
high that women who marry in their early teens would do better to
stay in school and marry later, even if it means not marrying the
father of their child. Moreover, it is highly dubious to extrapolate,
as Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale do, from the Baltimore data or
even from census figures to calculate the odds of success among
teenagers who marry. Though one in three of the Baltimore women
who wed as teenagers was still married a decade and a half later, it
does not follow that the odds would be as high for everyone. As we
have seen, the women who marry early are a self-selected group:
they have the best shot at making it. Their peers who might follow
them into early marriage would undoubtedly face still stiffer odds
of staying married. And as we have seen, the costs of a wrong decision-namely,
divorce--increase
a woman's chances of economic
destitution in later life.
Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale are right in one respect. Women
who marry, whether early or late, do somewhat better than women
who never marry. Although they were better educated, had fewer
children, and were just as likely to be employed, women who never
married were somewhat more likely to be on welfare and poor at
the seventeen-year
follow-up. They did about as poorly as their
peers who got married and subsequently separated. Being a single
mother is disadvantageous whether you get there by a marriage that
does not work or by not marrying at all.
So I do not take issue with Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale's contention that it would be desirable to promote stable marriages and
greater paternal support for single parents. Unfortunately,
their
discussion includes no concrete proposals for attaining either objective, and we should recognize that both of these goals have continually eluded polieymakers.

I that
WOULDADVISEthat
we concentrate
our efforts onfathers
trying provide
to ensurea
both never-married
and formerly-married
fair measure of support to their offspring. In two separate studies, I
discovered that never-married
and formerly-married
fathers are
about as likely--or in this instance unlikely--to
provide economic
support to their children: only about a third of the members of
either group can be counted on for any kind of regular support.
Many polieymakers have come to recognize that this is an unacceptably low number; the Child Support Act passed by Congress in 1984
was designed to remedy this situation. And while it is still too early
to assess the effects of this sweeping legislation, initial indications
suggest that its success is only modest. There is room for a great deal
of tightening-up
in the system of child-support collection. Most
European countries successfully induce fathers to pay child support,
as a reeent book by Alfred Kahn and Sheila Kammerman demonstrates. Clearly there is some room in this country for improvement
through administrative innovations, and perhaps through mobilization of public sentiment.
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On the matter of promoting marriage and marital stability, there
is less cause for confidence. For reasons that are not completely understood, marriage rates are dropping in all developed nations in the
West. As the rate of marriage declines and marriage age rises, persuading-not
to mention pressuring--pregnant
teenagers to marry
is probably going to become increasingly difficult.
Changing sexual patterns among young people also reduce the
chances that they will marry in the event of a pregnancy.
Two
decades ago, women who initiated sex in their mid- or late teens
were usually formally or informally engaged to their sexual partner.
Now that sexual activity occurs earlier and marriage later, teenagers are not nearly so likely to expect to marry their first sexual
partner (or even their second or third). We have recently been interviewing the children of the women in the Baltimore study. By their
mid-teens, almost all are sexually active; about a third of the girls
have become pregnant
before eighteen. Virtually
none of these
young women contemplates
marriage before her twenties. And the
young men who have fathered children, even when they assume a
large measure of responsibility for their offspring, are equally unready to commit themselves to marriage. As one nineteen-year-old
father in this situation told us:
I feel as though if I get married right now, I don't know how to deal with
it. All the people I know that got married at a young age, they may be
still married but they're not together. If I marry a person, I want to spend
my whole entire life with that person.
Should (and could) we encourage teenagers like those in the Baltimore study to rethink their decision to defer marriage? We could,
for example, create incentives for pregnant teens to marry by providing preferential placement in job-training
programs or child care
for their offspring if they are willing to wed. I doubt whether such
policies would coax many teens into marriage before they feel ready.
Furthermore,
incentives would have the negative feature of discriminating against single parents who need jobs and child care even more
than those who marry in order to attain economic self-sufficiency.
Unless Vinovskis and Chase-Lansdale
are able to come up with
some plausible proposals to make early marriage more viable, they
are left in the untenable position of arguing that rhetoric alone can
make a significant difference in reversing powerful demographic
trends. I think they are mistaken in their belief that social-scientific
opinion had anything to do with the trend away from early marriage
among pregnant teens over the past decade. If they want to persuade
social scientists to reassess their views on the desirability of early marriage, they must produce more convincing evidence than that offered
thus far. I still think the pregnant teens are right: a hasty marriage
usually makes a bad situation even worse.
Frank F. Furstenberg,
of Pennsylvania.

Jr. is Professor of Sociology at the University

